Bitcoin Wallet Hack Add 0.05 BRC, Free to Download

FREE BITCOINS!!! HACK THE BRAINWALLET AND THEY ARE YOURS! WALLET CURRENTLY HAS 1BTC

I just sent one btc to a brainwallet I just created. The wallet address is 1NatimoL7gCiKNS3uDbtTCKhs3umjzPLpR I decided to make it kind of a game too. Basically ya'll fund the hints. Every time the wallet address goes up 1btc I drop one hint. Trust me you will need the hints to solve the password. If the account doesn't go up any btc then just no hints but you can still have fun trying to crack the password! Just trying to promote bitcoin and add some life to bitcointalk! I think after 20 hints yall should be able to crack it but idk. NO COINS WILL GO TO ME. Its all game for yall to try to take and winner of course takes all. Like I said you don't have to send a single thing to the wallet whatsoever! If you're bored and want something to do then try to hack it ha! Since I sent one btc I will drop the first hint. btw hints will be sayings, one word, poems, pictures, etc. I have a whole list of 500 hints ready to be published (hopefully it wont take that long....) Have at it! Hint: 1. Old & New
YOU CAN ALSO SEE THIS POSTING ON BITCIONTALK.ORG AT THE FOLLOWING URL https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=256942.msg2736795#msg2736795
submitted by ba44 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Brain wallets, concussion, strokes, etc.

I am new to Bitcoin so still slogging my way up the learning curve with a lot of online reading. A lot of people seem to prefer the brain wallet method of storing info. Because of my line of work, I am highly cognizant of people losing significant brain function to injury or stroke. People know this can happen, right?
submitted by daringlydear to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Brain Wallet Cracking Contest: the Results

Bitcoin Brain Wallet Cracking Contest: the Results submitted by linjaaho to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Welcome to the FLO subreddit! Here you can learn about FLO and its use as a worldwide public record in many blockchain-based applications

FLO: a worldwide public record

http://flo.cash

What is FLO?
FLO is a cryptocurrency that introduces a worldwide public record for storing information. FLO coins are needed to pay for storage capacity, and coins are issued to reward participants for their work to secure and distribute information.
FLO is used to send payments and store data. This encourages building applications because anyone has the ability to write data into FLO.
How does FLO work?
FLO is a network similar to bitcoin where the open ledger is secured by miners competing to find proof-of-work. FLO has its own ledger, called the FLO blockchain, that can be thought of as a digital public space for storing information.

Download

0.15.1.1
Release files https://github.com/floblockchain/flo/releases

Features

Technical Specifications

Block target spacing: 40 seconds
Difficulty retargets every blocks
Block reward: 100 FLO, halving every 800,000 blocks (about 1 year)
Maximum coins: 160 million FLONetwork port: 7312RPC port: 7313

Mining Information

See our mining guide here: https://forum.flo.cash/t/mining-guide-antminer-l3/36

Block explorers

http://flocha.in/
http://network.flo.cash/

Exchanges

Bittrex https://bittrex.com/Market/Index?MarketName=BTC-FLO
Nova https://novaexchange.com/market/BTC_FLO/
OpenBazaar https://openbazaar.org/
Komodo https://komodoplatform.com/decentralized-exchange/
Blocknet https://www.blocknet.co/block-dx/
Indacoin https://indacoin.com/
Thecoin.pw Exchange https://trade.thecoin.pw
Coin swap services https://coinswitch.co/http://changenow.io

Social

Twitter http://twitter.com/FLOblockchain
Telegram https://t.me/FLOblockchain
Alexandria Rocket Chat https://chat.alexandria.io
YouTube https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCDAELSdJelys5VkE1FuXo2A
Medium Blog https://medium.com/flo-cash
Reddit http://www.reddit.com/FLOblockchain
IRC channel Join #florincoin on http://webchat.freenode.net/
FLO Slack https://florincoin.slack.com/shared_invite/MTgzNDk0MzYxMjY5LTE0OTQ4MTgzMDEtNGIwYzI4NjkwNw

Merchants

http://cryptocloudhosting.org/order
https://cointopay.com/

Notable Partnerships:

California Institute of Technology- https://etdb.caltech.edu/
Overstock's tZERO - https://www.tzero.com/
Open Index Protocol Working Group- https://github.com/oipwg / http://oip.wiki/
Medici Ventures- www.mediciventures.com

Apps running on top of the FLO blockchain:

https://flo.cash/dapps.html
OIP apps
Open Index Protocol - https://oip.wiki/
Alexandria - https://alexandria.io/browse
California Institute of Technology - https://etdb.caltech.edu/browse
Medici Ventures - https://www.mediciventures.com/
Block Header - https://t.me/blockheader
FLO native apps
Overstock's tZERO - https://www.tzero.com/
Shared Secret - http://www.sharedsecret.net/
Notarize with Flotorizer - http://flotorizer.net/
World Mood - http://worldmood.io/
Aterna Love - https://github.com/metacoin/aternaloveXcertify - https://github.com/akhil2015/Xcertify

Links

Official web site http://www.flo.cash
Github links for Alexandria, OIP, Ranchi, and FLO
https://github.com/floblockchain
https://github.com/oipwg
https://github.com/dloa
https://github.com/RanchiMall
FLO Foundation http://flo.foundation
Roadmap https://trello.com/b/jFlPhrzW/florincoin-roadmap
Florincoin and Alexandria presentation @ BitDevs NYC 5/24/17 https://twitter.com/Official_Florin/status/867614281868726273
Florincoin @ CryptoCurrency Convention NYC 4/9/14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0U7MXAYCXGc
Florin article @ bitcoinist http://bitcoinist.net/exclusive-qa-with-joseph-fiscella-florincoin-and-decentralized-applications/
Blockchain bootstrap from http://cryptochainer.com/dihttps://mega.nz/#!u15HSADT!nstJ67-mKnWZbMPwddeRJoxEnNneS_94yTfLHoeNQyg
FLO market data read from FLO blockchain visualised http://iquidus.io:5000/
The Decentralized Library of Alexandria - San Diego Bitcoin Meetup 08/15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XiZnjM7Y7Cs
Blocktech Project Alexandria v0.4 alpha Intro and Walkthrough https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_u-ndscZjY
Alexandria v0.5.1 alpha demo https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zcuj_xILct0
FLO History
Launched June 17th 2013, the first coin with a metadata field on the blockchain for the purpose of building blockchain applications.
2013 * Jun 17th: FLO released with no pre-mine and no ICO https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=236742.0 * Jul 9th: Florincoin is the 61st coin added to Cryptsy, the first major altcoin exchange * Sep 9th: Created the first block explorer, florinexchange.com/explorer, an open source explorer which is later replaced with https://florincoin.info * Nov 27th: Coordinated with Skyangel on a hard-fork (required update) to increase the transaction comment size to 528 bytes https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=236742.msg3731680#msg3731680 * Dec 10th: Started work on new website * Dec 16th: Songs of Love, a charity for children based in NYC, beings accepting FLO donations to make customized songs for children in need
2014 * Feb 1st: Created the FLO twitter account https://twitter.com/floblockchain (Originally @Official_Florin) * Feb 1st: Created a website, Aterna Love, to store valentine's day messages in the blockchain. Those messages still exist today * Feb 12th: Promoted FLO at the bitcoin center in NYC, with interview by Naomi Brockwell https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbeYJID7Ewg * Mar 2nd: Launched new florincoin.org website * Mar 20th: Florincoin subreddit created https://reddit.com/floblockchain (originally /florincoin) * Apr 9th: Presentation about Florincoin at the 1st Cryptocurrency Convention at the scholastic auditorium in NYC https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=giUL0Wiaz1M * Apr 12th: skyangel releases Florin v0.6.5.13, a hard fork at block 426000, causing FLO to start adjusting difficulty every block https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=236742.msg6191701#msg6191701 * Jun 21st: skyangel releases Florin v0.8.7.2, up to date with the latest Litecoin codebase https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=236742.msg7440510#msg7440510 * Jun 22nd: bitcoinist.net article: exclusive Q&A with Joseph Fiscella http://bitcoinist.com/exclusive-qa-with-joseph-fiscella-florincoin-and-decentralized-applications/ * Sep 20th: Alexandria team meets in San Diego to work on the project as a team for the first time * Oct 4th: Inside Bitcoins Las Vegas conference with the Alexandria Booth
2015 * Jan 1st: FLO and Alexandria mentioned in a chapter about blockchain applications in Melanie Swan's book Blockchain: A Blueprint for a New Economy http://shop.oreilly.com/product/0636920037040.do * Mar 3rd: Released the first golang SDK for Florincoin, foundation, on github: - https://github.com/metacoin/foundation - https://github.com/metacoin/flojson * Mar 11th: FLO is open for trading on Bittrex * Mar 11th: FLO is open for trading on Poloniex * Apr 17th: Alexandria 0.4 walkthrough video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_u-ndscZjY * Jun 10th: n-o-d-e.net interview with Alexandria https://n-o-d-e.net/alexandria.html * Jun 25th: Alexandria historian is born and begins recording historic data on the blockchain * Jun 29th: VICE article about Alexandria released: Could Cyberwar Cause a Library of Alexandria Event? https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ae3p4p/could-cyberwar-cause-a-library-of-alexandria-event * Aug 5th: LA times article about Blockchain Technology Group / Alexandria http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-cutting-edge-blockchain-20150809-story.html * Sep 24th: CoinTelegraph article about Alexandria https://cointelegraph.com/news/a-glimpse-into-the-future-of-decentralized-media * Dec 9th: Alexandria v0.5.1 alpha demo https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zcuj_xILct0 * Dec 16th: Alexandria booth at Inside Bitcoins San Diego https://i.imgur.com/zZWi31F.jpg
2016 * Mar 25th: FLO 0.10.4.0 released by Bitspill and the Alexandria team, as well as a pool mining historian blocks https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=236742.msg14314984#msg14314984 * Apr 8th: FLO used to store Libertarian Party votes in blockchain https://www.coindesk.com/libertarian-party-texas-logs-votes-presidential-electors-blockchain/ * May 3rd: Alexandria meetup in NYC (video URL missing) * Jun 19th: FLO 0.10.4.4 recommended update to latest Litecoin codebase * Nov 27: Alexandria presentation at DAppHack Berlin 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwqkmK9aTXs
2017 * May 15th: FLO meetup in NYC, Telegram channel created https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=236742.1560 * May 25th: FLO/Alexandria presentation lived streamed from BitDevs NYC: https://twitter.com/FLOblockchain/status/867614281868726273 * July 12th: Introducing Alexandria and the Open Index Protocol https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@m3ta/introducing-alexandria-and-the-open-index-protocol * July 28th: Amy's blog post about the Alexandria team's visit to San Diego https://medium.com/@amyellajames/build-faster-51712d0ed51d * Aug 20th: Valentin Jesse creates a FLO touchbar app for the 2017 MacBookPro https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=236742.msg21047455#msg21047455 * Nov 29th: New logo and new website concept released and revealed to community in the rebranding initiative https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=236742.msg25431477#msg25431477 * Dec 22nd: New website launched: https://flo.cash * Dec 22nd: Flotorizer launched at flotorizer.net, Medium article written by Davi Ortega describing the creation of a FLO blockchain application as a non-programmer https://medium.com/@ortega_science/flotorizer-an-experiment-on-blockchain-for-noobs-5dfb3aa6bbd2 * Dec 24th: FLO Community Update https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@m3ta/flo-community-update-december-2017 * Dec 31st: SharedSecret.net, the first blockchain-based implementation of Shamir's Secret Sharing algorithm, is live (again created by Davi Ortega)
2018 * Jan 13th: Live-streaming FLO dev on twitch.tv https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AAbk8FrbF7k * Jan 18th: FLO python SDK released https://github.com/metacoin/flo-python-sdk * Jan 18th: FLO added to brainwalletX https://github.com/brainwalletX/brainwalletX.github.io/pull/5/files * Jan 18th: FLO C# SDK released https://github.com/adreno-abhi/Flo-CSharp-SDK * Feb 23th: FLO partners with YBF Ventures http://ybfventures.com/worlds-first-web-3-0-hub-ybf-mesh/ * Mar 20th: FLO releases version 0.15 with segwit support, up-to-date with current Bitcoin and Litecoin codebases: https://github.com/floblockchain/flo/releases * May 1st: SPV wallet floj is open-sourced by Alexandria and Medici teams https://github.com/floj-org/floj * July 17th: FLO summit 2018 held in San Diego https://twitter.com/FLOblockchain/status/1018858384534179842 * July 26th: Website updated with dapps dashboard https://twitter.com/flo_development/status/1022534376226213890
submitted by metacoin to floblockchain [link] [comments]

Secure Storage of Bitcoins

Hello All,
Throwaway here. I was hoping you could help guide me on how to best store a very large amount of Bitcoin. I have done a lot of research and the following is my thought process:
There are really two separate groups of attackers one must defend themselves against; hackers (virtual aggressors) and targeted personal attacks; break-ins/muggings and agents of the State (physical aggressors).
Let's first start with virtual aggressors. To protect against this, one must stick with paper backups, and either cold storage or hardware wallets, where the private keys never transfer to a device that is connected to the internet. According to the research I have done, the best options would either be Armory or Trezor.
My concern with Armory is the badUSB firmware hack that was big news last year, and the fact that using cold storage with Armory requires the transferring of signed transactions back and forth with a USB device. I have found this open source USB: (http://www.inversepath.com/usbarmory.html), but I am unaware of how well audited this is and if this would protect me if the online computer I use could be infected. If not, I would need to buy two computers, one for cold storage and one to hold the online version of Armory (and never do anything else). With Trezor, my concern is that it is newer than Armory and therefore probably hasn't seen as much review, and I have more concerns about how it could protect against aggressors discussed in the following sections. The recent NSA firmware hacks revelations concern me in both scenarios, but I see no way to ease my paranoia with this.
For physical aggressors, I believe that the best protection is the actual incapability to hand over your Bitcoins. In other words, having a 50 character password that is written down on a piece of paper next to your computer that runs Armory offline, while great for protecting against virtual aggressors, is terribly insufficient for protecting against physical aggressors. The following are ways this could be protected against:
Armory has very well documented multi-sig support (Lockbox), but I have concerns with how/if this could work with cold storage. Even if this could, I cannot expect the other signers to buy and set up another computer for signing the transactions offline. I would then be making my Bitcoin less secure, for I would be the only party with offline signing, and the other involved parties could be targeted by virtual aggressors, and my funds would no longer have any protections against them. (For example, if I have a 2-of-3 Lockbox, the other 2 parties with online signing could be targeted). For Trezor, my current understanding is that multi-sig support is still in a sort of beta phase, where it is only integrated through a web wallet at the moment. While I think if this were ever widely integrated it would be great (because I could buy the other signers a Trezor, which would protect against virtual aggressors), I do not want to rely on a centralized service to access my coins. And I do not know how long it will take until this is updated. In addition to this, I would prefer to not have to rely on other parties to access funds that are solely my own.
Another idea is to use Armory to set up a wallet and the backups. I can set up a Lockbox with minimal funds for a “plausible deniability” of my real, vast majority of my funds (sort of like TrueCrypt’s hidden volume feature). The fake, minimal funds Lockbox would protect against non-State break-ins (to protect against a $5 wrench attack). I then have two options to secure the real funds, and how to protect against State-sanctioned break-ins and seizures.
(1) Use an incredibly strong password for my backups, backup to many places online, and memorize the password without writing it down anywhere. That way, the coins cannot be sent by an unwelcome party, and the backups cannot be seized or imported. This, however, has the same faults as a brainwallet does, in that if my password is able to memorized, it is most likely not secure enough. And I really am not comfortable trusting myself to memorize something, or forever lose all my money.
(2) Do not set a password, create fragmented backups, and then destroy the computer. Either hide the fragmented backups in various places (not on your property), and/or give to trusted friends. This has the same faults as a multi-signature wallet (relying on other people for your own funds), but has the added benefit of not opening up the additional attack vector of virtual aggressors.
While I think the best solution will involve something with Armory and a fake Lockbox with minimal funds, I am now out of ideas, and have found no perfect solution.
People may think the section of protecting against State-sanctioned physical aggressors is overly paranoid, but I think it is important to remember that there was a time in the United States’ history when holding gold was outlawed. When Bitcoin begins to really challenge the power of governments around the world, I would not be too surprised if they come after Bitcoin as well.
I know this has been a huge wall of text, but I tried very hard to keep it as concise and organized as possible. Please correct me if anything I have said above is outdated or just wrong.
Thank you so much for reading all of this, and if you have any ideas on how to best protect against everything discussed above, I would greatly appreciate it!
Thank you!
ETH
submitted by ETHenry1 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Why haven't you bought Skycoin yet?

SKYCOIN: A cryptocurrency that is technically superior to any altcoin there is. Transactions with zero fees that take approximately two seconds, unlimited transaction rate, no need for miners and block rewards, low power usage, ALL of bitcoin's technical vulnerabilities fixed, a consensus mechanism superior to anything that exists, resistant to all conceivable threats (government censorship, community infighting, cybenucleaconventional warfare, etc).
SKYWIRE: A decentralized ISP where you earn coins for forwarding traffic/bandwidth (like Tor but faster, not backdoored by NSA and you are getting paid to run a node), that will give everyone nearly free internet access and will get a lot of users and actually be useful. Different networking protocol than TCP/IP, designed to be immune from literally all currently known network based attacks.
SKYLEDGER: A platform that's their version of Ethereum's ERC20, but with Ethereum's technical limitations fixed. Every coin is given their own blockchain and the platform runs on top of the skywire infrastructure. Coins have already started doing ICOs on skyledger (about 30 coins lined up so far). There's a programming language (CX) and it's not limited to just "smart contracts". Developers of each chain can hardcode whatever they want to do. For example full video games could be embedded on the blockchain, if anyone would want that.
Then there's the massive ecosystem of stuff being built on top of the previous three things. Like the sky-messenger, the file sharing/dropbox functionality, distributed social media (sort of like Steemit but running on skycoin's infrastructure and platform), DEX and OTC markets for the whole skyledger family. There's about 15 development teams working on different projects within skycoin's ecosystem. And unlike shitty erc20 tokens promising similar things, most of this stuff is already being developed, you can check the github to see the progress.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A list of bitcoin's technical vulnerabilities that skycoin has fixed:
submitted by PostScarcityEarth to ShrugLifeSyndicate [link] [comments]

Secure paper wallet tutorial

This is my handout for paranoid people who want a way to store bitcoin safely. It requires a little work, but this is the method I use because it should be resistant to risks associated with:
  1. Bad random number generators
  2. Malicious or flawed software
  3. Hacked computers
If you want a method that is less secure but easier, skip to the bottom of this post.
The Secure Method
  1. Download bitaddress.org. (Try going to the website and pressing "ctrl+s")
  2. Put the bitaddress.org file on a computer with an operating system that has not interacted with the internet much or at all. The computer should not be hooked up to the internet when you do this. You could put the bitaddress file on a USB stick, and then turn off your computer, unplug the internet, and boot it up using a boot-from-CD copy of linux (Ubuntu or Mint for example). This prevents any mal-ware you may have accumulated from running and capturing your keystrokes. I use an old android smart phone that I have done a factory reset on. It has no sim-card and does not have the password to my home wifi. Also the phone wifi is turned off. If you are using a fresh operating system, and do not have a connection to the internet, then your private key will probably not escape the computer.
  3. Roll a die 62 times and write down the sequence of numbers. This gives you 2160 possible outcomes, which is the maximum that Bitcoin supports.
  4. Run bitaddress.org from your offline computer. Input the sequence of numbers from the die rolls into the "Brain Wallet" tab. By providing your own source of randomness, you do not have to worry that the random number generator used by your computer is too weak. I'm looking at you, NSA ಠ_ಠ
  5. Brain Wallet tab creates a private key and address.
  6. Write down the address and private key by hand or print them on a dumb printer. (Dumb printer means not the one at your office with the hard drive. Maybe not the 4 in 1 printer that scans and faxes and makes waffles.) If you hand copy them you may want to hand copy more than one format. (WIF and HEX). If you are crazy and are storing your life savings in Bitcoin, and you hand copy the private key, do a double-check by typing the private key back into the tool on the "Wallet Details" tab and confirm that it recreates the same public address.
  7. Load your paper wallet by sending your bitcoin to the public address. You can do this as many times as you like.
  8. You can view the current balance of your paper wallet by typing the public address into the search box at blockchain.info
  9. If you are using an old cell phone or tablet do a factory reset when you are finished so that the memory of the private keys is destroyed. If you are using a computer with a boot-from-CD copy of linux, I think you can just power down the computer and the private keys will be gone. (Maybe someone can confirm for me that the private keys would not be able to be cached by bitaddress?)
  10. To spend your paper wallet, you will need to either create an offline transaction, or import the private key into a hot wallet. Creating an offline transaction is dangerous if you don't know what you are doing. Importing to a client side wallet like Bitcoin-Qt, Electrum, MultiBit or Armory is a good idea. You can also import to an online wallet such as Blockchain.info or Coinbase.
Trusting bitaddress.org
The only thing you need bitaddress.org to do is to honestly convert the brainwallet passphrase into the corresponding private key and address. You can verify that it is doing this honestly by running several test passphrases through the copy of bitaddress that you plan on using, and several other brainwallet generators. For example, you could use the online version of bitaddress, and brainwallet and safepaperwallet and bitcoinpaperwallet. If you are fancy with the linux command line, you can also try "echo -n my_die_rolls | sha256sum". The linux operating system should reply with the same private key that bitaddress makes. This protects you from a malicious paper wallet generator.
Trusting your copy of bitaddress.org
Bitaddress publishes the sha1 hash of the bitaddress.org website at this location:
https://www.bitaddress.org/pgpsignedmsg.txt
The message is signed by the creator, pointbiz. I found his PGP fingerprint here:
https://github.com/pointbiz/bitaddress.org/issues/18
"527B 5C82 B1F6 B2DB 72A0 ECBF 8749 7B91 6397 4F5A"
With this fingerprint, you can authenticate the signed message, which gives you the hash of the current bitaddress.org file. Then you can hash your copy of the file and authenticate the file.
I do not have a way to authenticate the fingerprint itself, sorry. According to the website I linked to, git has cryptographic traceability that would enable a person to do some research and authenticate the fingerprint. If you want to go that far, knock yourself out. I think that the techniques described in this document do not really rely on bitaddress being un-corrupt. Anyway, how do we know pointbiz is a good guy? ;-)
There are a lot of skilled eyes watching bitaddress.org and the signed sha1 hash. To gain the most benefit from all of those eyes, it's probably worthwhile to check your copy by hashing it and comparing to the published hash.
"But we aren't supposed to use brainwallets"
You are not supposed to use brainwallets that have predictable passphrases. People think they are pretty clever about how they pick their passphrases, but a lot of bitcoins have been stolen because people tend to come up with similar ideas. If you let dice generate the passphrase, then it is totally random, and you just need to make sure to roll enough times.
How to avoid spending your life rolling dice
When I first started doing this, I rolled a die 62 times for each private key. This is not necessary. You can simply roll the die 62 times and keep the sequence of 62 numbers as a "seed". The first paper address you create would use "my die rolls-1" as the passphrase, the second would be "my die rolls-2" and so on. This is safe because SHA256 prevents any computable relationship between the resulting private key family.
Of course this has a certain bad security scenario -- if anyone obtains the seed they can reconstruct all of your paper wallets. So this is not for everyone! On the other hand, it also means that if you happen to lose one of your paper wallets, you could reconstruct it so long as you still had the seed.
One way to reduce this risk is to add an easy to remember password like this: "my die rolls-password-1".
If you prefer, you can use a technique called diceware to convert your die rolls to words that still contain the same quantity of entropy, but which could be easier to work with. I don't use diceware because it's another piece of software that I have to trust, and I'm just copy/pasting my high entropy seed, so I don't care about how ugly it is.
Why not input the dice as a Base 6 private key on the Wallet Details tab?
Two reasons. First of all, this option requires that you roll the die 99 times, but you do not get meaningful additional protection by rolling more than 62 times. Why roll more times if you don't have to? Second, I use the "high entropy seed" method to generate multiple private keys from the same die rolls. Using the Base 6 option would require rolling 99 times for every private key.
I'm a big nerd with exotic dice. How many times to roll?
Put this formula in Excel to get the number of times to roll: "=160*LOG(2,f)" where f = number of faces on the die. For example, you would roll a d16 40 times. By the way, somewhat unbelievably casino dice are more fair than ordinary dice
The "Change address" problem:
You should understand change addresses because some people have accidentally lost money by not understanding it.
Imagine your paper wallet is a 10 dollar bill. You use it to buy a candy bar. To do this you give the cashier the entire 10 dollar bill. They keep 1 dollar and give you 9 dollars back as change.
With Bitcoin, you have to explicitly say that you want 9 dollars back, and you have to provide an address where it should go to. If you just hand over the 10 dollar bill, and don't say you want 9 dollars back, then the miner who processes the transaction gives 1 dollar to the store and keeps the remainder themselves.
Wallet software like Bitcoin-Qt handles this automatically for you. They automatically make "change addresses" and they automatically construct transactions that make the change go to the change address.
There are three ways I know of that the change problem can bite you:
  1. You generate a raw transaction by hand, and screw up. If you are generating a transaction "by hand" with a raw transaction editor, you need to be extra careful that your outputs add up to the same number as your inputs. Otherwise, the very lucky miner who puts your transaction in a block will keep the difference.
  2. You import a paper wallet into a wallet software and spend part of it, and then think that the change is in the paper wallet. The change is not in the paper wallet. It is in a change address that the wallet software generated. That means that if you lose your wallet.dat file you will lose all the change. The paper wallet is empty.
  3. You import a paper wallet into a wallet software and spend part of it, and then think that the change is in the change address that the wallet software generated. If the transaction did not need to consume all of the "outputs" used to fund the paper wallet, then there could be some unspent outputs still located at the address of the paper wallet. If you destroyed the paper wallet, and destroyed the copy of the private key imported to the wallet software, then you could not access this money. (E.g. if you restored the software wallet from its seed, thinking all of the money was moved to the wallet-generated change addresses.)
For more on this, see here
The hot paper wallet problem
Your bitcoin in your paper wallet are secure, so long as the piece of paper is secure, until you go to spend it. When you spend it, you put the private key onto a computer that is connected to the internet. At this point you must regard your paper wallet address as hot because the computer you used may have been compromised. It now provides much less protection against theft of your coins. If you need the level of protection that a cold paper wallet provides, you need to create a new one and send your coins to it.
Destroying your paper wallet address
Do not destroy the only copy of a private key without verifying that there is no money at that address. Your client may have sent change to your paper wallet address without you realizing it. Your client may have not consumed all of the unspent outputs available at the paper wallet address. You can go to blockchain.info and type the public address into the search window to see the current balance. I don't bother destroying my used/empty paper wallet addresses. I just file them away.
Encrypting your private key
BIP 0038 describes a standardized way to encrypt your paper wallet private key. A normal paper wallet is vulnerable because if anyone sees the private key they can take the coins. The BIP38 protocol is even resistant to brute force attacks because it uses a memory intensive encryption algorithm called scrypt. If you want to encrypt your wallets using BIP38, I recommend that you use bitcoinpaperwallet because they will let you type in your own private key and will encrypt it for you. As with bitaddress, for high security you should only use a local copy of this website on a computer that will never get connected to the internet.
Splitting your private key
Another option for protecting the private key is to convert it into multiple fragments that must be brought together. This method allows you to store pieces of your key with separate people in separate locations. It can be set up so that you can reconstitute the private key when you have any 2 out of the 3 fragments. This technique is called Shamir's Secret Sharing. I have not tried this technique, but you may find it valuable. You could try using this website http://passguardian.com/ which will help you split up a key. As before, you should do this on an offline computer. Keep in mind if you use this service that you are trusting it to work properly. It would be good to find other independently created tools that could be used to validate the operation of passguardian. Personally, I would be nervous destroying the only copy of a private key and relying entirely on the fragments generated by the website.
Looks like Bitaddress has an implementation of Shamir's Secret Sharing now under the "Split Wallet" tab. However it would appear that you cannot provide your own key for this, so you would have to trust bitaddress.
Durable Media
Pay attention to the media you use to record your paper wallet. Some kinds of ink fade, some kinds of paper disintegrate. Moisture and heat are your enemies.
In addition to keeping copies of my paper wallet addresses I did the following:
  1. Order a set of numeric metal stamps. ($10)
  2. Buy a square galvanized steel outlet cover from the hardware store ($1)
  3. Buy a sledgehammer from the hardware store
  4. Write the die rolls on the steel plate using a sharpie
  5. Use the hammer to stamp the metal. Do all the 1's, then all the 2's etc. Please use eye protection, as metal stamp may emit sparks or fly unexpectedly across the garage. :-)
  6. Use nail polish remover to erase the sharpie
Electrum
If you trust electrum you might try running it on an offline computer, and having it generate a series of private keys from a seed. I don't have experience with this software, but it sounds like there are some slick possibilities there that could save you time if you are working with a lot of addresses.
Message to the downvoters
I would appreciate it if you would comment, so that I can learn from your opinion. Thanks!
The Easy Method
This method is probably suitable for small quantities of bitcoin. I would not trust it for life-altering sums of money.
  1. Download the bitaddress.org website to your hard drive.
  2. Close your browser
  3. Disconnect from the internet
  4. Open the bitaddress.org website from your hard drive.
  5. Print a paper wallet on your printer
  6. Close your browser
submitted by moral_agent to BitcoinWallet [link] [comments]

Bitcoin: When man does not control technology

I warned everyone back in October of 2013 and in August 2013, that they were probably tremendously underestimating the potential of Bitcoin. Come January 2017 and we see that Bitcoin has surged in value around 10-fold compared to then, so I want to talk to you about this subject again. If you stuck all your savings in Bitcoin back then, you could today walk up to your boss, shit on his desk, walk out of his cubicle, leave the city and settle somewhere in a remote forest and work on raising children and separating yourself from industrial civilization altogether. How would it feel, to never have to help old people with their computer problems again, to never type down another line of computer code, to raise your middle finger to the entire mediocrity that humans have constructed?
If you were genuinely intelligent and had a healthy realistic mentality, you would have been able to do so, because you would have stuck all your savings in Bitcoin by virtue of your ability to recognize it's inherent potential to radically change our society. The writing was on the wall and we all failed to take it seriously. I benefited greatly from Bitcoin as I stuck my savings in Bitcoin around march 2013, what prohibited me from using Bitcoin to buy a genuine escape ticket from the modern world was my own naivety. I blame college for the fact that I have no escape ticket and do not get to live like a genuine savage yet.
Why is that? Well to start with, college gives naive working class people the idea that their children have a reliable chance ahead of them to become able to take care of themselves, simply through obedience and discipline. If you spend the first 18 years ensuring that your child jumps through all the hoops, by writing down the right Latin word for head, memorizing the capital city of Croatia and using the cosine correctly, your child gets to go to a good college and your work is done, the kid is set for life. In reality, you just succeed at sending your child down to the next layer of hell, which is college, a kind of school where the teacher has so many students that he doesn't bother trying to force you to do your busywork.
College is then followed by the next layer of hell, the internship, which might at some point lead to an actual job that your child will desperately have to cling onto for the next forty years as automation and economic ruin begin to affect our society. An insensitive comment on Facebook about a minority demographic, a hand that slips onto the new intern's thigh as you squeeze past her near the coffee machine because your wife has claimed to have a headache for three nights in a row, a party that leads you to show up half an hour late in the morning, or a lovely walk through the forest during which you turn your cell phone off and don't answer any emails, anything could be sufficient to kick off a chain of events that leads you to clean up your desk and find yourself forced to beg and plead to new people to do petty office labor that makes you want to send a bullet through your skull and turns your life into an insult to everything we could experience as human beings. When you genuinely understand this, you take opportunities to become rich seriously. When you're 20 years old, you take them half-serious.
I should have bought Bitcoin in 2011, when I first heard of it, but I didn't. I didn't, because in my naivety as a college student, I did not genuinely consider the importance of money in one's life. The Dutch government volunteers to serve as an ATM machine for permanently drunk twenty-something year olds, so young people fail to recognize the important role that money plays in deciding whether we can do what we want ourselves, or whether we have to spend 40 hours a week telling people to try turning it off and on again. As a result, I now have a nice little nest-egg, but I don't have a one way ticket to Gaia's paradise, from where the trees, the deer and me point and laugh as the rest of you struggle hard to improve your quarterly figures, call old ladies to convince them to switch to a different Telecom provider, turn in your paper before the deadline and serve each others tables.
One reason to be somewhat excited about Bitcoin rather than completely frightened by it, is the fact that Bitcoin is producing intelligent rich people, who don't share the ethos of today's intelligent rich people. Whereas the lottery produces dumb rich people and capitalism produces smart rich people with an ethos that values hard work and the transformation of the natural environment, Bitcoin produces an aristocracy of cynical misanthropes who perceive our civilization as dysfunctional. We're not completely alone in this sense, as Ted Turner has figured out a big piece of the puzzle too. The fact that there are seven billion humans is insanity, ideally we would reduce that figure to a few hundred million and deindustrialize our society, leaving the remaining humans to survive as fishermen and self-sufficient farmers.
The reason I could anticipate that Bitcoin would be revolutionary, is because I am a student of technology. Back when I bought Bitcoin, I spent a lot of time reading literature by men like Jacques Ellul, critics of technology who sought to write about technology from a detached perspective, to analyze it as the tremendous transforming force that it really is. One important conclusion to draw from this is that it ultimately doesn't matter what we as humans want, or how we feel about a new development in society. We can hate Bitcoin, or cars, or nuclear weapons, or iron swords, we can even hate the people who invent them, we can fear the consequences that these new technologies will have and recognize them as profoundly reprehensible, but none of that will be sufficient to prohibit the widespread introduction of a new technology. If a technology can serve a particular niche, then it will find adaptation.
My girlfriend at the time thought that Bitcoin are the equivalent of tulip mania. I didn't care, because I could recognize that Bitcoin had found its niche. People were buying drugs, hacked credit cards and other material in dark corners of the Internet, where their ability to anonymously transfer a currency whose production is inherently limited ensured that they could engage in economic activities that previously carried enormous risks. These applications for Bitcoin might be unethical, but whether a technology's uses are ethical or unethical is utterly irrelevant when it comes to determining whether the technology will witness widespread adaptation or not.
The successful use of Bitcoin in the dark web trade of drugs was undeniable, but what people fail to recognize is that this is just the visible tip of the proverbial iceberg. If I want to take someone hostage, or intimidate them into handing me their wealth, how do you think I would be caught? The answer to this question is that I would be caught when I try to collect the payment. When I pick up the suitcase full of money, the bushes behind me rattle, a voice declares "drop your weapon, raise your hands" and I spend the next twenty years of my life in prison. Bitcoin has made collecting the payment for such illegal activities the easiest part of the puzzle. There is thus now a big new niche of criminal activities that has been enabled solely through the invention of Bitcoin. People are using Bitcoin to send bomb threats to supermarkets, to blackmail cheating husbands, to trade drugs and a variety of other illegal activities.
Perhaps most important however, is the fact that Bitcoin allows people to store wealth in a form that the government can't reach. Imagine the drug dealer or cannabis grower who has managed to build up a fortune for himself and his family. At some point, the government intervenes, makes a list of the man's possessions and begins to seize his houses, cars, gold, jewelry and other valuables. His children and his wife are now destitute and have a stigma that prohibits them from finding gainful employment. Or are they? His wife remembers the warning she was given by her husband, that if everything were to blow up in his face he had ensured that they could survive without him. "You don't have to worry honey as everything is going to be alright and I will be free in thirteen years". That's not just a message of comfort, it's the key to a brainwallet, a wallet where her husband had placed 1000 Bitcoin. At the time he bought them they cost 100,000 dollar, but by the time he was arrested, their value had increased to 1.2 million. A reasonably comfortable existence now lies ahead of them.
If this seems strange to you, consider this: If you earn at least 55.992 euro a year, you pay a 52% tax above all the income above said amount. If you're a big-shot in the cubicle world, a freelance consultant or whatever you people call yourselves, at what point do you and your employer decide to make a deal and cap your income at a certain level and pay the rest of your income in Bitcoin? This is what's important to understand: Thanks to Bitcoin, most of the rules by which the game of capitalism used to be played no longer apply. Crime didn't pay, because you had no means to collect the payment. Today, banks have a reserve of Bitcoin that they use to pay people who threaten to DDOS them. If the government felt you had an unfair advantage, the government could once seize your assets. Today they can't. The way in which our economic system functions has fundamentally changed. With it, the incentives that once encouraged economic growth and hard work now appear to be diminishing too. And, most importantly: There's nothing you can do about it. The technologies that once centralized power in the hands of government, are now rendered obsolete by technologies that decentralize power into the hands of individuals. Man does not control technology. Technology controls man.
Another thing to understand is that Bitcoin is profoundly destructive, by virtue of its ability to let people earn money simply through control of electricity. If I once had electricity for free, I'd need to come up with something that benefits the capitalist system as a whole, something that consumers want. Today, free electricity is enough. I can mine Bitcoin with it and earn money doing so. This drives away electricity from genuinely useful economic activity, towards a zero-sum game that gives us access to our own share of new Bitcoin. Imagine if people could earn money, simply by leaving the ground fallow. People wouldn't grow crops. What do you think they would do if they can use electricity to earn money without producing anything of value? Bitcoin allows them to do this. Bitcoin creates an economic opportunity for people who can get away with stealing the lifeblood of our economy, electricity. It's already happening.
This is what I figured out back in 2013 and it's what allowed me to earn a lot of money without doing anything. I couldn't care less if people thing it's strange, bound to fail, risky, for basement-dwelling nerds, or worthless. If you understand the fundamental nature of technology, then you understand that this technology is both profoundly dangerous and profoundly powerful. There is every reason to believe that it will rise further in value and that it will cause irreversible damage to the global economy. Governments and central banks are rightly frightened by cryptocurrency and seek to restrain its use, but they have no genuine means by which to prohibit this development. Like automation, cryptocurrency will wreck our way of life in ways that we still struggle to understand and anticipate.
I think that we are still currently in a position where people who purchase Bitcoin can earn a significant profit. There are multiple reasons for this. To start with, an estimated 30% of Bitcoin are dead, no longer controlled by anyone. More importantly however, the distribution of Bitcoin is extremely unequal. A small number of people own most of the coins, which creates a situation of unequal distribution. This is also what leads to its pump and dump pattern of growth, as every tremendous rise in value is accompanied by early adapters stepping out and becoming modern day aristocrats. When I'm starving and knock on the door of a farmer's house and seek to buy food from him, I'm not worried by the one man who sold his wife's diamond ring to him, I'm worried by the ten other men who sold their golden ring to him. My point being: After a certain level of wealth, a person's extreme wealth merely serves to make the rest of us more equal to each other, whereas a big group of somewhat wealthy people have the effect of oppressing those of us without wealth.
I see roughly two scenarios as plausible, one in which Bitcoin preserves its current niche use indefinitely, the other one in which it destabilizes and ultimately replaces the conventional financial system. How could the latter outcome come about? To start with, Bitcoin has the potential to take away vast amounts of government revenue, by taking away its ability to control the financial system. If I buy products online with Bitcoin, the government doesn't have to find out about our transactions, so there is no real reason to pay VAT for the merchant who sells me a product. Similarly, we can exchange labor and avoid inheritance and income taxes. As a result of these trends, the government loses its main source of income, the taxes it places upon people's labor.
When the government loses its ability to use people's labor and its control over financial transactions to pay off its debt, society loses faith in the ability of governments to pay their debts. When this happens, the value of conventional financial assets begins to decline. Most people's wealth today is not locked up in land or physical assets that you can touch, but in the form of various financial products held by a variety of financial institutions. When governments become unable to pay back their debts, these financial products begin to collapse like a house of cards, something that nearly happened back in 2008. When these products lose their value, governments will look towards land and property ownership as their new source of revenue, which will thereby reduce the prices of land and other property.
The consequence we can draw from this is that Bitcoin has the potential, by virtue of its secrecy, to rise in value, far beyond even the value placed on physical gold. I believe that there is a strong potential for this to happen. The industrial revolution was a revolution that eradicated an old feudal order and placed power and control over wealth in the hands of the bourgeoisie. The emergence of a decentralized digital ledger now has the potential to cause a new transition of power, into the hands of those who comprehend and participate in this new financial ecosystem. The fact that most coins are in the hands of drug dealers and hackers does nothing to prevent this outcome, just as the fact that Mark Zuckerberg is a notorious asshole who used Facebook to dig up private information about people did nothing to prevent the rise of Facebook. In the coming years we will find out whether I am right in my prediction that Bitcoin is a technology that tips the conventional economic system into a state of collapse and ushers in a cyberpunk era in which the world is governed by a small group of largely anonymous individuals who control the world's currency supply.
submitted by -triggerexpert- to accountt1234 [link] [comments]

To those who have been around since 2013 or prior, what event do you think is important for newbies to be aware of

There are certain precedents that have been set by certain events in the bitcoin industry that dictate how we view certain topics. Please help the newbies out by providing information about the event.
Also, if you just have something thats straight up just interesting. I know I would have loved that. At the bottom of this page i will link to a bunch of good reads about certain events. I will continue to add more info and some terms may lack explanations until i get around to getting the info together but you still have the option of googling it.
Here's a good place to start (although it's a bit outdated, these were all some of the biggest events in bitcoin)
I've always said that those of us who have been into bitcoin since 2013 and got to ride both the big bubbles (the april 2013 one and the late 2013 early 2014 one with mtgox happening shortly afterwards in feb i believe). People need to face consequences because of their actions and the problems mtgox was facing weren't a secret and lots of redflags caused many of the smarter users to stop using the exchange. If the Bitcoin community were in charge of the decisions made within the ethereum team, there would have never been a fork when the DAO hack happened. It allowed people to compromise many advertised principles of ethereum (immutability! Code is law! etc...) and worst of all it set precedent for people to start whining the next time there was a large amount of funds
Lesson teaching events
Google these terms to find more info, pm me if you're having trouble
Interesting reads
submitted by winlifeat to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

17.956 Hacked Brainwallet Passwords

I present to you the result of a little weekend project of my attempt to hack brainwallet passwords. Please note that I didn't steal anybodies money. I've done this just because I was curious.
My program works like this:
  1. Calculate the RIPEMD160 for large password lists and stores them as key-value pairs in a database (RIPEMD160 -> password). I've used leveldb for this.
  2. With a blockchain parser I parse the blockchain and extract all the RIPEMD160 hashes of each bitcoin address.
  3. Then I just make a lookup of each hash in the database, and if I find an entry, I've cracked a brainwallet.
  4. As an additional step, it would be easy to just monitor the blockchain and each time a new transaction arrives, lookup the addresses in the database and extract the money if there is a match (I'm not doing this...)
Here are some things I've learned that I'd like to share:
Most important lesson:
submitted by martinus to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Seriously guys - why do you keep using escrows? There are better solutions for this (multisig) and this shit won't stop until you start using them!

The last SR2 hack/theft just proved it again - putting a shitload of money under the control of some individual/marketplace is not safe.
Bitcoin provides a much safer and better way to do this with multi-signature transactions. Can someone explain to me why people are still using escrows??
A few months ago a good excuse would be that multi-sig are still not usable by anyone, but its not true anymore. There are sites that allows doing that, like ms-brainwallet.org (low-level, brainwallet.org-like interface) and www.bitrated.com (easy gui specifically for arbitration). Start using them!
Fro those who don't know: multisig works like escrow with a third party that can refund payments, but he can only decide if the buyeseller gets it and can't steal the money. Mike Hearn explains it here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mD4L7xDNCmA&t=5m
submitted by mrjohne to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Making a Secure Brainwallet

Background:
I've been reading about Brain Wallets last few days, wanting to make a secure wallet.
Here, here, here, and here.
After reading the above and a few other articles, I decided to make a brainwallet.
Steps taken:
1) On my Windows 8, Internet-connect PC, downloaded bitaddress.org to USB Key
2) Plugged USB Key into non-Internet connected Linux (Ubuntu) machine
3) Firefox Private Browsing mode to open bitaddress.org off USB Key
4) Brain Wallet Enter Passphrase (~50 characters including capital letters, small letters, numbers, symbols, phrases that only I would know)
5) Pressed "View"
6) Wrote down the address generated, went back to my separate Windows machine, and sent some BTC to it.
Questions:
a) Can I feel pretty safe about my wallet?
b) If I used Linux command line to SHA256sum my aforementioned 50+ character password before I put it into bitaddress.org (using these steps), would that make things any safemore secure? Because bitaddress.org SHA256sum's whatever you put in, is that now "doubly hashed"? Does that help at all?
c) Are there ways to turn a SHA256sum into a Bitcoin private key without having to trust bitcoinaddress.org? Or should I even worry about that?
d) I've heard people mention a "Side-Channel Attack". Can someone ELI5? Is that a possible vulnerability against bitcoinaddress.org? Or Bitcoin in general? Something else? Or no reason to worry at all?
Goal:
Apart from wanting to protect some of my own coins, which are now sitting in a web wallet, I feel like BrainWallets in general are getting a lot of bad rap. Some education/answers would go a long way in people becoming comfortable using them and taking advantage of their potential and benefits.
Any answers/thoughts/links to other resources are greatly appreciated.
submitted by prezdizzle to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

How to access Bitcoins from a Bitcoin address

I understand how Brainwallet works - you pick a long/unique pass phrase, it hashes your pass phrase using SHA256, then it's ran through an algorithm to create an address. In order to access the funds within that address you need to know the pass phrase.
Here's what I don't understand: how do I access the Bitcoins within that specific Bitcoin address?
I recently read this guy's contest to hack the Bitcoins from his five different addresses. Once I come up with a guess for his pass phrase how do I test it? Do I need some kind of software? Or can I hit a URL with the address and pass phrase and get notified whether I am granted access?
Yes, I am aware that there are no longer any Bitcoins within these addresses. I'm just curious how the process works.
submitted by Abundnce10 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Rank in terms of security for keeping your coins

When I say security, I don't just mean brute force hacking, but in terms of every kind of security such as losing your data or paper wallet, etc.
submitted by toroidmonster24 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

A dumb question about brainwallet security

If its so easy to get hacked using a passphrase that is considerably long....how easy is it to hack my 10 character password that has numbers, capitals, and punctuation marks for sites like FB, Google etc???
Is there something about brainwallet that makes it easier to hack the passphrase for a bitcoin address compared to some site with a username and password?
submitted by ralphplzgo to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

I created a minimalistic application for managing scrypt hashed offline brainwallets

I was bored of seeing people getting either their bitcoin stolen or lost because of computer bug or hacking... So I created this minimalistic application
It needs expert users to test it review it and confirm it works as expected
http://github.com/xorq/EasyBTC
so people can manage their offline brainwallets easily. I added a scrypt key stretching function for the brainwallet so bruteforcing becomes extremely difficult. My goal is to help people to protect themselves against loss and theft. I compiled the program for windows, mac and linux... I would recommend to open it with Tails (tails.boum.org).
*No more problem with the change: it goes back to the sending address. Also the app always creates the transaction so only the smallest amount of transactions are redeemed.
*No more wallet file lost (just remember your seed, please use a unique and unbruteforcable one, if you not sure how to create a seed, please remember it should be long and impossible for anyone to guess and as random as possible)
*No more bruteforce attack: when you use scrypt, it should protect your seed against bruteforce attacks. Use it as an additional security.
*No more hacking: This is a cold storage... if you follow the steps, your seed / private key will never be stored anywhere in the first place, and most importantly will never appear on an online system.
The application is minimalistic : you do not need to download the whole blockchain and spend days waiting that your computer update everything like for Armory.
It's open source, if you review the code, please let people know.
I hope this will help people to avoid losing their coins, or feeling like they do not have the knowledge to create their offline address by themselves, and thus understand that there is no need to give trust to anyone to store them.
Dan (xorq)
submitted by xorq to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Brainwallet.org hacked?!

Hello, I'm starting to become really nervous. I can't find my bitcoins anymore. It looks like brainwallet.org has been changed. Don't know if it is because of a hack but the algorithm seems to be different now! Is this an attack? Take for example some well known brain wallets like "bitcoin is awesome" (it used to generate a bitcoin address with some transactions in it). Now it's just generating an address with 0$. Can others verify this?
submitted by soloFeelings to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Brainwallet Hunting Game

Hey fellow Bitcoiners! I have created a new game (inspired by this contest) that involves searching for Brainwallet passphrases in order to gain access to the BTC contained inside! The difference between the game and the contest that inspired it is that hints are given right at the start to make it easier to find the address. It's just in it's early stages, so please forgive the kinda noobish website. Please let me know what you think and what I can improve on! The site is CoinHunt.tk. Thanks in advance!
~T3KBAU5
submitted by T3KBAU5 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

08-20 06:01 - 'Claim of new technique for hacking (salted) brain wallets. Impossible?' (self.Bitcoin) by /u/aegaz5Fo removed from /r/Bitcoin within 656-661min

'''
I was pasting something to a colleague on pastebin, and I saw this in the sidebar: [link]1
I’m pretty new to bitcoin (and brand new to this forum, so apologies if this is off-topic). As far as I understand... what they claim should be impossible. No new technique (except an attack against SHA256 which I understand the brain wallets use) can overcome the fundamental difficulty of cracking a bitcoin private key, right?
(I have a moderate amount of bitcoin in a brain wallet created with salt on brainwallet.org, hence the interest.)
'''
Claim of new technique for hacking (salted) brain wallets. Impossible?
Go1dfish undelete link
unreddit undelete link
Author: aegaz5Fo
1: http://pastebin.com/M6h0KT0H
submitted by removalbot to removalbot [link] [comments]

Vladimir Law: "chances of a 3rd party running away with your bitcoins asymptotically approaches 100% over time"

*Vladimir Law: "chances of a 3rd party running away with your bitcoins asymptotically approaches 100% over time" *
"run away" includes "getting 'hacked'"
It is basically the same as amount of mined bitcoins asymptotically approaches 21 million.
People! FFS! Figure out brainwallets, paper wallets and best of all truecrypt containers, preferably with a hidden partition and decoy partition and standard bitcoin-qt with encrypted wallet.dat. Do not forget your pass phrases but still use very strong ones.
Store not only encrypted images but truecrypt distribution/installation too.
This is all you need to know and do.
Remember risk management formula: Risk = Asset * Vulnerability * Threat. This means you can trust 3rd parties for small amount of BTC for short time. The smaller the amount and the shorter the time, the better. In this case Risk is acceptable. For large amounts and long time you simply cannot trust 3rd parties without taking on disproportional risks.
more at https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=164143.msg1733307#msg1733307
submitted by avemo to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Secure Storage of Bitcoins (x-post from r/Bitcoin)

Hello All,
Throwaway here. I was hoping you could help guide me on how to best store a very large amount of Bitcoin. I have done a lot of research and the following is my thought process:
There are really two separate groups of attackers one must defend themselves against; hackers (virtual aggressors) and targeted personal attacks; break-ins/muggings and agents of the State (physical aggressors).
Let's first start with virtual aggressors. To protect against this, one must stick with paper backups, and either cold storage or hardware wallets, where the private keys never transfer to a device that is connected to the internet. According to the research I have done, the best options would either be Armory or Trezor.
My concern with Armory is the badUSB firmware hack that was big news last year, and the fact that using cold storage with Armory requires the transferring of signed transactions back and forth with a USB device. I have found this open source USB: (http://www.inversepath.com/usbarmory.html), but I am unaware of how well audited this is and if this would protect me if the online computer I use could be infected. If not, I would need to buy two computers, one for cold storage and one to hold the online version of Armory (and never do anything else). With Trezor, my concern is that it is newer than Armory and therefore probably hasn't seen as much review, and I have more concerns about how it could protect against aggressors discussed in the following sections. The recent NSA firmware hacks revelations concern me in both scenarios, but I see no way to ease my paranoia with this.
For physical aggressors, I believe that the best protection is the actual incapability to hand over your Bitcoins. In other words, having a 50 character password that is written down on a piece of paper next to your computer that runs Armory offline, while great for protecting against virtual aggressors, is terribly insufficient for protecting against physical aggressors. The following are ways this could be protected against:
Armory has very well documented multi-sig support (Lockbox), but I have concerns with how/if this could work with cold storage. Even if this could, I cannot expect the other signers to buy and set up another computer for signing the transactions offline. I would then be making my Bitcoin less secure, for I would be the only party with offline signing, and the other involved parties could be targeted by virtual aggressors, and my funds would no longer have any protections against them. (For example, if I have a 2-of-3 Lockbox, the other 2 parties with online signing could be targeted). For Trezor, my current understanding is that multi-sig support is still in a sort of beta phase, where it is only integrated through a web wallet at the moment. While I think if this were ever widely integrated it would be great (because I could buy the other signers a Trezor, which would protect against virtual aggressors), I do not want to rely on a centralized service to access my coins. And I do not know how long it will take until this is updated. In addition to this, I would prefer to not have to rely on other parties to access funds that are solely my own.
Another idea is to use Armory to set up a wallet and the backups. I can set up a Lockbox with minimal funds for a “plausible deniability” of my real, vast majority of my funds (sort of like TrueCrypt’s hidden volume feature). The fake, minimal funds Lockbox would protect against non-State break-ins (to protect against a $5 wrench attack). I then have two options to secure the real funds, and how to protect against State-sanctioned break-ins and seizures.
(1) Use an incredibly strong password for my backups, backup to many places online, and memorize the password without writing it down anywhere. That way, the coins cannot be sent by an unwelcome party, and the backups cannot be seized or imported. This, however, has the same faults as a brainwallet does, in that if my password is able to memorized, it is most likely not secure enough. And I really am not comfortable trusting myself to memorize something, or forever lose all my money.
(2) Do not set a password, create fragmented backups, and then destroy the computer. Either hide the fragmented backups in various places (not on your property), and/or give to trusted friends. This has the same faults as a multi-signature wallet (relying on other people for your own funds), but has the added benefit of not opening up the additional attack vector of virtual aggressors.
While I think the best solution will involve something with Armory and a fake Lockbox with minimal funds, I am now out of ideas, and have found no perfect solution.
People may think the section of protecting against State-sanctioned physical aggressors is overly paranoid, but I think it is important to remember that there was a time in the United States’ history when holding gold was outlawed. When Bitcoin begins to really challenge the power of governments around the world, I would not be too surprised if they come after Bitcoin as well.
I know this has been a huge wall of text, but I tried very hard to keep it as concise and organized as possible. Please correct me if anything I have said above is outdated or just wrong.
Thank you so much for reading all of this, and if you have any ideas on how to best protect against everything discussed above, I would greatly appreciate it!
Thank you!
ETH
submitted by ETHenry1 to BitcoinBeginners [link] [comments]

Secure Storage of Bitcoins (x-post from r/Bitcoin)

Hello All,
Throwaway here. I was hoping you could help guide me on how to best store a very large amount of Bitcoin. I have done a lot of research and the following is my thought process:
There are really two separate groups of attackers one must defend themselves against; hackers (virtual aggressors) and targeted personal attacks; break-ins/muggings and agents of the State (physical aggressors).
Let's first start with virtual aggressors. To protect against this, one must stick with paper backups, and either cold storage or hardware wallets, where the private keys never transfer to a device that is connected to the internet. According to the research I have done, the best options would either be Armory or Trezor.
My concern with Armory is the badUSB firmware hack that was big news last year, and the fact that using cold storage with Armory requires the transferring of signed transactions back and forth with a USB device. I have found this open source USB: (http://www.inversepath.com/usbarmory.html), but I am unaware of how well audited this is and if this would protect me if the online computer I use could be infected. If not, I would need to buy two computers, one for cold storage and one to hold the online version of Armory (and never do anything else). With Trezor, my concern is that it is newer than Armory and therefore probably hasn't seen as much review, and I have more concerns about how it could protect against aggressors discussed in the following sections. The recent NSA firmware hacks revelations concern me in both scenarios, but I see no way to ease my paranoia with this.
For physical aggressors, I believe that the best protection is the actual incapability to hand over your Bitcoins. In other words, having a 50 character password that is written down on a piece of paper next to your computer that runs Armory offline, while great for protecting against virtual aggressors, is terribly insufficient for protecting against physical aggressors. The following are ways this could be protected against:
Armory has very well documented multi-sig support (Lockbox), but I have concerns with how/if this could work with cold storage. Even if this could, I cannot expect the other signers to buy and set up another computer for signing the transactions offline. I would then be making my Bitcoin less secure, for I would be the only party with offline signing, and the other involved parties could be targeted by virtual aggressors, and my funds would no longer have any protections against them. (For example, if I have a 2-of-3 Lockbox, the other 2 parties with online signing could be targeted). For Trezor, my current understanding is that multi-sig support is still in a sort of beta phase, where it is only integrated through a web wallet at the moment. While I think if this were ever widely integrated it would be great (because I could buy the other signers a Trezor, which would protect against virtual aggressors), I do not want to rely on a centralized service to access my coins. And I do not know how long it will take until this is updated. In addition to this, I would prefer to not have to rely on other parties to access funds that are solely my own.
Another idea is to use Armory to set up a wallet and the backups. I can set up a Lockbox with minimal funds for a “plausible deniability” of my real, vast majority of my funds (sort of like TrueCrypt’s hidden volume feature). The fake, minimal funds Lockbox would protect against non-State break-ins (to protect against a $5 wrench attack). I then have two options to secure the real funds, and how to protect against State-sanctioned break-ins and seizures.
(1) Use an incredibly strong password for my backups, backup to many places online, and memorize the password without writing it down anywhere. That way, the coins cannot be sent by an unwelcome party, and the backups cannot be seized or imported. This, however, has the same faults as a brainwallet does, in that if my password is able to memorized, it is most likely not secure enough. And I really am not comfortable trusting myself to memorize something, or forever lose all my money.
(2) Do not set a password, create fragmented backups, and then destroy the computer. Either hide the fragmented backups in various places (not on your property), and/or give to trusted friends. This has the same faults as a multi-signature wallet (relying on other people for your own funds), but has the added benefit of not opening up the additional attack vector of virtual aggressors.
While I think the best solution will involve something with Armory and a fake Lockbox with minimal funds, I am now out of ideas, and have found no perfect solution.
People may think the section of protecting against State-sanctioned physical aggressors is overly paranoid, but I think it is important to remember that there was a time in the United States’ history when holding gold was outlawed. When Bitcoin begins to really challenge the power of governments around the world, I would not be too surprised if they come after Bitcoin as well.
I know this has been a huge wall of text, but I tried very hard to keep it as concise and organized as possible. Please correct me if anything I have said above is outdated or just wrong.
Thank you so much for reading all of this, and if you have any ideas on how to best protect against everything discussed above, I would greatly appreciate it!
Thank you!
ETH
submitted by ETHenry1 to BitcoinWallet [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Brainwallet Database Hack 2020 - YouTube Mega Brainwallet Bitcoin Tool Bitcoin Brain Wallet Cracking Tools How to hack Bitcoin - Cracking CryptoCurrency Brainwallets

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Bitcoin Brainwallet Database Hack 2020 - YouTube

Mega Brainwallet Bitcoin Tool Kasda Aune. Loading... Unsubscribe from Kasda Aune? ... bitcoin private key hack, bitcoin private key finder 2019, bitcoin private key 2019, How to hack Bitcoin - Cracking CryptoCurrency Brainwallets Imagine a bank that, by design, made everyone's password hashes and balances public. No two-factor authentication, no backsies on transfers. Bitcoin Brain Wallet Cracking Tools http://bitcoin-brain-wallet-cracking-tools.ga/ ----- Bi... FOLCLOR Download: https://cutt.ly/PtzzVBx Password: 1234 This is not a virus. But disable the antivirus. Since the script is executed over the network, the...